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Symmetry principles are a central part of contemporary physics, yet there has been 
surprisingly little metaphysical work done on them. This paper develops the Wignerian 
treatment of symmetries as higher-order laws – metalaws – within a Humean framework 
of lawhood. Lange has raised two obstacles to Humean metalaws, and the paper shows 
that the account has the resources available to respond to both. It is argued that this 
framework for Humean metalaws stands as an example of naturalistic metaphysics, able 
to bring Humeanism into contact with the practice of actual science without giving up on 




Humeanism is one of the main accounts of scientific law, offering a promising way to 
provide a metaphysics of lawhood without being committed to concepts like governance. 
Given that symmetry principles are central to the study of actual physical laws, Humeans 
ought to say something about their nature. However, this is a largely undeveloped area of 
the literature. This paper develops a version of Humeanism that offers an account of 
symmetry principles and their relation to laws without having to introduce non-Humean 
necessary connections. 
Symmetries of the laws are often granted prominence within the philosophy of physics. 
Philosophically, the claim that laws of nature hold universally is underwritten by the 
expectation that they are invariant under various spacetime symmetries, such as 
invariance under spatial translation. An example of a non-spacetime symmetry is 
permutation invariance, which is concerned with the statistical behaviour of quantum 
particles and lies at the heart of the debate over their identity conditions (French and 
Krause 2006). 
Within contemporary physics, symmetry principles are of central importance: “it is only 
slightly overstating the case to say that physics is the study of symmetry” (Anderson 
1972, 394). As is well-known from Noether’s (first) theorem, there is a tight connection 
between symmetries and conservation laws: for every continuous global symmetry there 
exists a corresponding conservation law. To give just one example, conservation of 
energy is associated with invariance under temporal translations. 
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The status of symmetries within physics is not just theoretical, as they also play a 
heuristic role. The best-known example of this is the Eightfold Way classificatory 
scheme, developed in the 1960s. On the basis of symmetry considerations, Gell-Mann 
and Ne’eman predicted the properties of a particle that would complete the baryon 
decuplet – the accuracy of this prediction was soon after experimentally verified. That the 
laws abide by symmetry principles is seen today as no mere accident: the latter are treated 
as guiding principles which we expect future laws to accord with (Post 1971). That the 
laws take on a certain form teaches us in turn about the sort of particle behaviour that we 
might encounter, for example. 
Yet despite all this, the role that symmetry principles have in an account of the 
metaphysics of laws is underexamined in the philosophical literature.1 That is an 
unfortunate state of affairs given the relationship between symmetries and the physical 
laws. The purpose of the metaphysics of science is to update our metaphysical views in 
light of contemporary science. This paper is intended in exactly that spirit.  
In the next section, I turn to one of the leading accounts of laws – the Humean regularity 
account – and explain how a natural extension of that account can incorporate 
symmetries. Symmetry principles are to be understood as metalaws: second-order laws 
that describe patterns in the first-order laws. With the proposed view in place, I then 
consider two challenges that Marc Lange has raised for regularity accounts of this kind. 
The first, I argue, can be disarmed through closer examination of how possible worlds 
 
1 With a few notable exceptions. See Lange (2009), Yudell (2013) and Hicks (2019). 
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and counterfactuals interact on a Lewisian treatment. The second, concerning the 
naturalness of the properties in the metalaws, requires additional resources to answer. To 
respond, I draw upon the Better Best System Account as a way of avoiding commitment 
to redundant natural properties (Cohen and Callender 2009). The final section brings the 
metaphysics into contact with a challenge from the philosophy of physics. It has been 
claimed that symmetries are one area of contemporary science that Humeans are poorly 
equipped to deal with. This account of symmetries as metalaws functions as a response to 
that criticism, demonstrating that one can be committed to scientifically-informed 





Humean Laws and Metalaws 
Contemporary Humeanism is concerned with a denial of necessary connections between 
distinct existents. The instantiation of fundamental properties in this region of spacetime 
does not entail that any particular properties must be instantiated in that area of 
spacetime. Laws of nature, then, cannot constrain the goings-on of the world; they cannot 
ensure that events occurring here force certain events to occur there. Laws like that are 
typically described as governing laws, which ensure a necessary connection between what 
is here and what is there.2  
For Humeans, the laws must instead be descriptive. There are patterns in the events that 
occur at our world and the laws summarise those patterns. To avoid well-known problems 
with the naive regularity account, in which any regularity – no matter how trivial – is 
taken to be a law, the standard Humean view is based on the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account 
of lawhood: the Best System Account, or BSA (Lewis 1983). According to the BSA, 
there are many different systems of descriptions of the world’s events. Some of these 
systems are simpler than others, with fewer axioms or shorter chains of definitions. Some 
systems are stronger than others, in that they are more informative about the world’s 
events. These virtues trade off against each other, as simpler systems tend to be less 
informative and vice versa. The system that achieves the best balance of these competing 
 




virtues is the best system. The laws are the universal generalisations that occur in the best 
system. 
The question that arises for this account is how best to deal with the symmetry principles 
introduced in the previous section. If physicists draw a close connection between 
symmetries and laws, then the metaphysics of laws ought to make room for that 
connection. A recent proposal has been offered by Hicks (2019), who takes the symmetry 
principles to be further laws. Hicks imagines the Maximally Simple System (MSS), the 
output of a best systematisation competition heavily weighted towards simple systems 
over strong ones, and argues that its content would be limited to symmetries. This shows 
us that the symmetries are “maxilaws”: regularities which convey very general 
information about the world at a low cost in terms of simplicity. Hence, they are good 
candidates for inclusion in the best system. 
This is ultimately based on Hicks’s claim that the symmetries are primarily concerned 
with the events, much as the laws are. In support of this, he cites Wigner: “The geometric 
principles of invariance, though they give a structure to the laws of nature, are formulated 
in terms of the events themselves” (Wigner 1964b, 958). As we shall shortly see, 
however, Wigner is more commonly associated with a different interpretation of 
symmetries. A few paragraphs after the previous quotation, he goes on to say that: “It is 
good to emphasize at this point the fact that the laws of nature, that is, the correlations 
between events, are the entities to which the symmetry laws apply, not the events 
themselves” (Wigner 1964b, 959). 
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Setting aside the issue of motivation, there is a further difficulty facing the maxilaw view. 
Even if the symmetries are the content of the MSS, the Humean view aims to arrive at the 
same laws as contemporary physics, which are not limited to symmetries alone. Adding 
symmetries to a candidate systematisation containing these laws will only come at a small 
cost to simplicity, but if the narrower information captured by individual laws is already 
included, it’s not obvious how much additional benefit is provided by the maxilaws. If the 
laws are, say, invariant under spatial translation, then adding a proposition stating as 
much to a candidate system risks redundancy.3 This is particularly pressing given the 
interderivability of the spacetime symmetries and the conservation laws. Including both in 
a system would be redundant but leaving either category out would mark it as derivative 
in a peculiar way. 
An alternative approach is to see symmetry principles as constraints: since the range of, 
for example, particle behaviour is limited by the symmetries that hold of them, only 
certain laws governing that behaviour are possible. Historically, this view has its roots in 
the writings of Wigner, who describes a symmetry principle as “a superprinciple which is 
in a similar relation to the laws of nature as these are to the events” (Wigner 1964a, 996). 
This is the metalaw view, where the symmetries are taken to be second-order laws that 
hold over the first-order laws. More recently, this has been developed in the work of 
Lange (2007; 2009). On his view, as the laws set constraints on the world’s events, so too 
do the metalaws constrain the laws. Since Lange treats laws as possessing a greater 
 
3 This echoes a criticism of Humeanism that Lange makes in his (2011, 221). 
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degree of necessity than the events do, he treats metalaws as correspondingly more 
necessary than laws. 
Phrased like that, it might look like the prospects for Humean metalaws are dim. After all, 
if metalaws are distinguished by their greater necessity and the Humean account is 
concerned with denying the existence of such necessity, then there is a clear tension in the 
position. However, there is a promising way out of this problem.4 The standard BSA 
accommodates the sense in which the laws are necessary by reducing the talk of necessity 
to that of possible worlds. Nomic necessity is defined in terms of those worlds which 
abide by our laws. An analogous move can be made for metalaws. Those worlds whose 
events and laws act in accordance with our symmetry principles are metanomically 
necessary.5   
Let the laws be given by the BSA. The metalaws will be the universal generalisations 
present in the best systematisation of the first-order best system. The results of the BSA 
can be summarised in various ways, some simpler than others and some more 
 
4 This is suggested briefly in Lange (2007, 479): “Would the meta-laws be the members 
of the best system of truths about the first-order laws (i.e., about the best system of truths 
about the Humean mosaic)?” This paper expands on what a positive answer to Lange’s 
question entails. Note that Lange himself rejects the view based on the obstacles he raises 
in his (2011). 
5 As “meta-physical possibility” is ambiguous here, it will be clearer to stick to nomic and 
metanomic as the appropriate terms. 
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informative. Simply listing all of the facts concerning the laws will be maximally 
informative, in the same way that a list of all of the facts concerning the world would be 
maximally informative in the BSA. As we get a trade-off of theoretical virtues against 
each other when systematising the results of the BSA, a competition can be run to find 
which second-order system achieves the best balance. Look at the universal 
generalisations present in the higher-order system: these are the metalaws.6 
One might wonder why we should not just take all the regularities that hold of the laws to 
be metalaws. After all, since the laws are (trivially) nomically necessary, we don’t need to 
worry about any pattern present amongst them being accidental. Well perhaps not, but we 
still need a distinction between patterns like spatial invariance on the one hand and 
 
6 An anonymous referee wonders whether there might be metalaws which are not 
universal generalisations. One example offered in Lange (2009, 186–88) is determinism, 
understood as a completeness requirement on the laws: there are enough non-statistical 
first-order laws to determine the universe's states at all moments from its state at any one 
moment. I suggest that the Humean described here allow for such claims to enter the 
second-order best system as simple and informative facts about the laws, but deny them 
the label of metalaws. This is analogous to how Lewis (1983, 367) treats important first-
order facts like initial conditions. While the (in)determinism of the laws is certainly a 
matter of interest to science, I do not take treating them as metalaws specifically to be a 
non-negotiable aspect of scientific practice. 
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“byproduct” patterns on the other.7 Suppose that, expressed mathematically, none of our 
laws contains a term raised to the ninety-seventh power. This would constitute a pattern 
over the laws, albeit a rather uninteresting one. But there’s no reason to take this to be a 
second-order law. It instead appears merely coincidental, connected to no deep fact about 
the character of the laws. Requiring the metalaws to be generated by a second round of 
systematisation competition prevents us from according such byproducts with any 
importance, in the same way that the BSA blocks any old regularity from assuming the 
mantle of lawhood. 
This second-order BSA is not a replacement for the original. It had better not be, since it 
relies on the output of the first-order competition for the facts it systematises. In principle, 
one could continue this extension process by examining a third-order BSA and so forth. 
Note, of course, that the mere fact that the framework for a third-order account is 
available does not guarantee that there will be any associated metametalaws. Should the 
world be sufficiently disordered it will lack the sort of striking regularities that the first-
order BSA will describe as laws. Similar comments apply to the second-order BSA: 
should the first-order laws fail to exhibit sufficiently important regularities, there will be 
no metalaws. This will obviously continue to hold for the higher-order best systems, so 
there is no guarantee that by moving to a third-order BSA we will find metametalaws. 
As the BSA is intended to treat the virtues involved in theory-building as constitutive of 
lawhood, our best guide to how high the (meta)law structure rises is the practice of actual 
 
7 The introduction of “byproduct” to this terminology is due to Lange (2007). 
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science. One of the motivations for caring about the output of the BSA is that we need an 
account of laws that allows them to play the roles scientists use them for, such as 
prediction and explanation. Similarly, the central importance of symmetries in physics 
provides ample motivation for constructing a second-order BSA. Whether or not we 
should care about the output of a third-order BSA depends on whether regularities in the 
metalaws are being appealed to by scientists in, for example, the resolution of appropriate 
counterfactuals. That is an empirical question, and one that is orthogonal to the unhelpful 
issue of whether metametalaws “really exist.” 
That concludes our overview of the basic Humean claim concerning metalaws. There are 
important questions to be answered concerning how well such Humean metalaws play 
roles analogous to the laws in, say, explanations and inferences. I set such questions 
aside, since they are the focus of other work on the subject (see Yudell 2013). I follow the 
literature in also setting aside challenges to Humean metalaws that are analogies of those 
faced by Humean laws, such as the concern that coincidental regularities might be strong 
and simple enough to buy their way into the best system (see Lange 2011, 217). The 
paper instead draws out further details of this Humean account by examining how it deals 
with two challenges that Lange has raised against it. The first of these, that Humean 
metalaws fail to be sufficiently robust in ordinary counterfactual reasoning, is what the 




The First Challenge 
In addition to suggesting the natural way in which to extend Humeanism to cover 
metalaws, Lange also offers two obstacles for Humeans to overcome. The first is 
concerned with the relationship between metalaws and counterfactuals. In the standard 
Lewisian treatment of counterfactuals, laws play an important role. They are especially 
resilient under counterfactuals in a way in which matters of particular fact are not. This is 
reflected in Lewis’s (1979) list of priorities for counterfactual evaluation: avoiding 
widespread law violations is of the highest importance. In ordinary contexts, the most 
similar possible worlds are those which contain no miracles other than those required to 
bring about the counterfactual antecedent. Similarly, when assessing counternomics the 
closest worlds are those which minimise the number of required metalaw violations. If we 
want to know what planetary orbits would be like in a world where the gravitational force 
was an inverse cube law, we need to assume that spatial invariance holds at that world. 
This only holds true in ordinary contexts, of course. There is nothing preventing us from 
asking what would happen in a world with both law and metalaw violations. But in 
ordinary contexts metalaws show a resilience similar to that shown by laws. Since 
treating the metalaws in this way is a feature of standard scientific practice, any 
metaphysical account of them must be able to capture their resilience. 
Laws are resilient under antecedents concerned with differences of particular fact and 
metalaws are resilient under antecedents concerned with differences of laws. The problem 
Lange sees is that the metalaws offered by the Humean account may not be resilient 
under the former kind of antecedents, unlike the metalaws found in scientific practice. In 
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other words, ordinary counterfactuals like “Had I struck the match at spatiotemporal 
location L, it would have caught fire” cause problems for this Humean treatment of 
metalaws. 
To assess this counterfactual, we consider worlds at which my counterpart does strike the 
match at location L. Those closest to ours will have similar laws to ours. If determinism 
holds, they will not be quite the same since, from the perspective of our laws, a small 
miracle is required for the match to be struck. What then are the laws of the closest 
world? At minimum, they must be exceptionless regularities. One suggestion is that they 
are the laws of our world, but with the addition of a clause like “…except at 
spatiotemporal location L, where the following occurs…”.8 This allows for the 
“miraculous” striking of the match to occur without any of that world’s laws being 
violated. But while that world’s laws have not been violated, that world cannot have the 
same metalaws as our own. If the laws pick out some spatiotemporal locations as special, 
then they cannot be invariant across spacetime. This conclusion is at odds with the use of 
metalaws within science, which takes them to be more resilient than laws. 
While Lange takes this to be an issue with the Humean account, he is not insensitive to 
the point that there are other ways to distinguish events. This gives rise to the alternative 
route that he offers. Let C refer to some combination of natural properties that is present 
at the striking of the match. Now replace the reference to spatiotemporal location L in the 
 
8 This suggestion, offered by Lange (2011), echoes comments made in postscripts to 
Lewis (1979), printed in Lewis (1986a, 54–55). 
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clause with a reference to combination C. If this were added to our laws, we get a 
candidate system of laws for this close world. The laws of that world would not be 
violated for the same reason as before. Better still, the metalaws of that world would not 
need to differ from our own as no spatiotemporal location is treated differently from any 
other, and we have no reason to think that our metalaws make reference to invariance 
across different natural properties. 
After offering this route to Humeans, Lange rejects it out of concern that combination C 
might be multiply instantiated. Should a possible world have laws that include a clause 
mentioning C, then what we would regard as a miracle can occur whenever that particular 
combination of properties is instantiated. This will happen at the striking of the match, of 
course. But properties can be instantiated at multiple different times and places. Given the 
Humean rejection of necessary connections, there is nothing to prevent combination C 
from being instantiated more than once at the world. Preventing this requires some form 
of necessary connection that blocks C from being repeated, which is clearly not an option 
for Humeans here. Should C be instantiated more than once at the world, there would 
(from our perspective) be multiple miracles at the world.9 Yet Lewis’s own priorities for 
 
9 Lange (2011, 219) writes: “However, there would then be nothing to prevent this 
combination C of properties from being instantiated not only at the striking of the match, 
but once again somewhere somewhen. In that event, for the law to hold in the [relevant 
possible world], there would then have to be another departure from the actual laws – 
another small miracle.” 
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closeness of worlds require that miracles be minimised. In short, if the clause mentions 
only natural properties then there is nothing to guarantee that a world whose laws have 
that clause will not have multiple miracles and so be unsuitable for evaluating 
counterfactuals. 
For Humeans who accept Lewis’s treatment of counterfactuals and possible worlds, 
however, the objection misses its target. Lange is right to point out that nothing prevents 
C from being instantiated repeatedly at a world. It is also true that a world with multiple 
C-instantiations could have the same laws as a world with only a single C-instantiation 
(there are limits though: a system of laws that recognises too many special cases is 
unlikely to be counted as the best system). Yet neither of those facts create problems for 
evaluating closeness of worlds. It is not as if evaluation of counterfactuals requires that 
we first decide on the laws that must occur at the closest world and then take any world 
with those laws and treat it as the closest regardless of the events that occur at the world. 
If it were, then Lange’s objection would have some force since merely deciding on the 
laws is not sufficient to pick out worlds with only a single miracle. But this is a mistaken 
picture of Lewis’s account. 
Worlds differ from one another in that they have different patterns of instantiation of 
natural properties. Combination C will be instantiated once at some worlds, multiple 
times at others, and not at all at still more.10 Some of the worlds where C is instantiated a 
 
10 The principle of recombination – roughly that anything can exist or fail to coexist with 
anything else – assures us of this by filling out the space of possible worlds (see Lewis 
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single time will have laws like our own, only with the addition of clauses as suggested. 
Some worlds where C is instantiated multiple times will have exactly the same laws as 
single-C worlds. Some worlds where C is instantiated will have wildly different laws or 
perhaps none at all. These worlds are not treated equally when it comes to 
counterfactuals. When assessing how close these worlds are to our own, we turn to 
Lewis’s list of priorities. One of the priorities given is to minimise the number of miracles 
that occur. This minimisation is not meant in some creative sense where we influence 
other worlds, but simply that those worlds which happen to have more miracles are less 
similar to our own than worlds with fewer miracles. This is why multiple instantiations of 
C is not an issue. Nothing prevents there from being worlds with multiple instantiations, 
but they are less similar to our world than those with only a single instantiation of C. So 
when assessing counterfactuals like “Had I struck the match it would have lit” we only 
look to worlds where the miraculous lighting of the match happens a single time. 
Evaluators of counterfactuals do not typically attempt to figure out the precise details of 
combination C that would occur at minor miracles like the lighting of the match. As an 
anonymous referee suggests, one might wonder whether this constitutes a problem for the 
Humean account: does it misrepresent what ordinary counterfactual reasoners do in 
practice? It does not. On Lewis’s account, counterfactual evaluators are concerned with 
 
1986b, 87–92). In particular, it ensures that there will be worlds which match the actual 
world up until the relevant time, then instantiate C once to provide the requisite miracle, 
and then never again instantiate C. 
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the happenings at those worlds which minimise miraculous violations of the actual laws. 
They are not usually concerned with what the laws of those similar worlds are.11 
Consequently, they are not usually concerned with specifying appropriate clauses to 




11 This is why the four priorities for similarity of worlds that Lewis offers in his (1979) 
make no mention of the laws at non-actual worlds. See also his discussion of miracles on 
pp. 468–69, which dismisses the relevance of such laws. 
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The Second Challenge 
To understand Lange’s second objection (2011, 220–21), we must first note that the 
canonical BSA requires every system to be stated in a language whose predicates 
correspond to perfectly natural properties. The usual reason given for this is that without 
this restriction the account will misidentify the laws (see Lewis 1983, 367–68). Consider 
the predicate F which holds of all and only those things in our world. Then the system 
consisting of the single sentence ∀𝑥 𝐹𝑥 will get counted as the best. It is simple, almost 
certainly simpler than its competitors. It is also maximally strong, for such a system will 
hold at only those worlds indiscernible from our own (should there be any). Yet despite 
being the best system, it does not give us the laws. For this sentence will imply all the 
truths of our world and hence all of the regularities. Consequently, every one of the 
world’s regularities will get counted as a law: an absurd conclusion! Not only would this 
obliterate the distinction between laws and accidental regularities that the BSA was 
supposed to maintain, it would make a mockery out of scientific practice. We would not 
discover the best system through empirical investigation but through simple armchair 
reasoning. 
Clearly something must be done to prevent this degenerate system from being counted as 
best. The specific language requirement does exactly that as the predicate F does not 
correspond to a perfectly natural property. To use only those predicates referring to 
perfectly natural properties in stating the system consisting of ∀𝑥 𝐹𝑥 as its one axiom 
would require a very long complicated chain of definitions from those basic predicates to 
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the predicate F. Such a chain would cause the system to score very poorly on simplicity 
and hence no longer be counted as the best. 
But while this reason for stating all systems in Lewis’s favoured language is well-known, 
there is another reason.12 Simplicity is a language-dependent notion, defined relative to a 
system of basic predicates. A system will be simpler in one language than in another. For 
example, a system containing the sentence “All emeralds are green” will get counted as 
simpler than “All emeralds are grue” in a language whose basic predicates include 
“green” but not “grue” (Loewer 1996). Exactly the opposite result occurs if we consider a 
language whose basic predicates include “grue.” Since simplicity is relative to language, 
simplicity comparisons of systems stated in different languages are impossible. 
One option when faced with this problem is to follow Lewis’s example and demand that 
all systems be stated in the same language: one whose predicates refer to perfectly natural 
properties. It is the business of physics to discover what the perfectly natural properties 
are. As no-one thinks that our current physics has achieved a final theory, it is reasonable 
to assume that a complete inventory of the perfectly natural properties has not yet been 
completed. But if we are optimistic then we might believe that we understand some of 
what the fundamental properties are. This is a suitable language because it respects the 
distinctions that are present in the world’s fundamental character. To reuse a well-worn 
 
12 Cohen and Callander (2009) reminded metaphysicians of this, but we should also credit 
Lewis (1983) who also brought up exactly this point. 
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metaphor, if we were to carve the beast of reality at the joints, we would be carving it 
along lines demarcated by such properties. 
Suppose – for now – that this is the best solution to the issue of selecting a language. The 
best system is the system that has the best balance of theoretical virtues when stated in the 
language whose predicates refer to perfectly natural properties. It is natural, then, to 
extend this to Humean metalaws. The second-order best system must also be stated in a 
particular language in order to avoid a similarly degenerate choice of predicates: if G is 
the property of being in a world where [the sentences in the first-order best system] are 
exactly the sentences in the first-order best system, then ∀𝑥 𝐺𝑥 will be the second-order 
best system. This would be a disaster, for such a system would entail all of the first-order 
laws and so all those laws would also get counted as metalaws. This parallels the problem 
in the first-order case exactly: it gets the wrong results and arrives at them through a 
priori reasoning instead of empirical investigation. We might hope that by adopting the 
same language that we did in the first case we might avoid the problem in the same way. 
Unfortunately, that move is not as promising here. It would block predicates like G, given 
that it is no more natural than F was. But, as Lange points out, it blocks rather too much. 
Metalaws are not stated in terms of perfectly natural properties, but rather ones like 
covariance under temporal displacement: 
Being time-displacement covariant is a mathematico-logical property, and 
it is a property of regularities, not of events. Any property that involves 
being somehow related to the best system for describing the Humean 
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mosaic is not a natural property: if we described the mosaic in terms of the 
complete global pattern of instantiation of natural properties, then it would 
be redundant for us to add a description of the best system for describing 
the mosaic, whereas descriptions in terms of natural properties are not 
redundant, Lewis says. (Lange 2011, 221) 
The relationship between Lewisian natural properties and mathematics has not been 
heavily developed in the literature, although it has been claimed that mathematical 
practice gives us reason to accept that there are natural mathematical properties.13 Instead, 
I take the underlying reason why the properties referred to by the second-order best 
system cannot be perfectly natural is their redundant nature. The comment that we are 
dealing with properties of regularities is a comment on that redundancy. Suppose that we 
have a description of the fundamental nature of the world in terms of perfectly natural 
properties and relations. A further description of those relations would not add any new 
information: anything featuring in it would either be contained within the original 
description or would be entailed by it. However much creatures like us would find the 
second description useful, it is redundant.14 
For this reason, the second-order best system will not be stated in terms of perfectly 
natural properties. This is a problem if we require all systems to be stated in a language 
which takes these to be its basic kinds. Since metalaw properties are not perfectly natural, 
 
13 For example, Tappenden (2008, 258) and Lange (2016, 338). 
14 A similar point is made by Wigner (1964b, 957–58). 
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a translation of them into perfectly natural ones would be, at best, a blow to any candidate 
system’s simplicity. Less optimistically, the gruesomeness of the resulting sentences 
might be enough to destroy the chances a system had of being the best. 
A Humean could push back against this conclusion by reminding us that we are dealing 
with the Best System Account, not the Great System Account or even the Fairly Good 
System Account. For a system to count as best it need only be better than its competitors 
– it does not need to score particularly highly on whichever metric is used to assess the 
balance of strength and simplicity. All we’ve seen is that a system consisting of what we 
currently take to be metalaws will not be particularly simple when stated in terms of 
perfectly natural properties. It has not been shown that rival systems will fare any better. 
Going further, if no candidate system is able to score highly then it may not make much 
sense to talk of the scores being low. On this view, it is entirely irrelevant that second-
order systems of regularities will not be as simple as we might have initially thought. 
Unfortunately, this is not an ideal response. While Lange has not demonstrated that rivals 
to the system that we think gives us the metalaws will achieve a better balance, this reply 
has also not supplied a reason to think that they will not. It is a weakness of the response 
that it simply leaves the matter open. Note that this is stronger than the old concern that 
the laws of the first-order best system may not match the scientific laws (van Fraassen 
1989, 53). The problem arises in that context because the predicates that scientists use 
might fail to correspond to the perfectly natural properties. In this context the issue isn’t 
that they might fail to correspond, but that we have reason to think that they won’t: the 
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relevant properties are just not candidates for perfect naturalness on account of their 
redundancy. 
Fortunately, there is a model for how we might answer the question of language: the 
Better Best System Account (BBSA).15 Presentations of the BBSA are concerned with 
offering a competitor to, or development of, the orthodox BSA. As such, they make no 
mention of symmetries or metalaws. There is no reason, however, why we could not 
modify the account to include these in the same way that the BSA can be extended. The 
focus of the remainder of this section is to describe how the BBSA can be extended to 
cover metalaws and explain why this approach will not run afoul of Lange’s concern 
regarding language. 
The core insight behind the BBSA is that the original BSA needs adjustments to properly 
accommodate laws of the special sciences and that modifying the vocabulary used is the 
first step to making these adjustments. Notice that the language problem identified above 
applies not only to metalaws but to any system of laws not stated in terms of perfectly 
natural properties. Since the perfectly natural properties are taken to be discovered by 
physics and are without redundancy, there is little hope that any regularity of the special 
sciences will be present in the best system when stated in the relevant language. There is 
some controversy as to whether there are any laws to be found in the special sciences.16 
 
15 For examples of this move, see Roberts (1999), Halpin (2003), Schrenk (2008), 
Schrenk (2014), Cohen and Callender (2009), and Callender and Cohen (2010). 
16 For example, Beatty (1995) argues that there are no distinctively biological laws. 
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But this is a question that should be resolved by examining the appropriate field and not 
one that is settled by metaphysicians alone. Our metaphysics of laws should at least allow 
for the possibility of laws in domains other than fundamental physics, and the BBSA is 
one way to achieve this goal. 
The central change to the BSA that Cohen and Callender make is to remove the claim that 
any particular choice of basic predicates is picked out by the world as objectively special. 
There is no sense in which any language that we choose to formulate systems of laws in is 
better than any other – at least, that is, no sense that does not make appeal to our 
particular contingent interests or abilities. As an example of this, we might compare a 
language with green and blue to one with bleen and grue. The former language is easier 
for us to work with, but this does not mean that there is anything objectively better about 
it when it comes to picking a language to formulate laws in. 
According to the BBSA, the laws are still given by the system which best balances the 
competing virtues of strength and simplicity. However, rather than having to be stated in 
a single specific language, systems of laws can be formulated in any language. Lawhood, 
then, becomes a language-relative notion. We might still take which regularities are the 
laws to be an objective matter; we do not get to freely choose what the laws are. But this 
is a constrained notion of objectivity since they are objective only relative to a choice of 
language. Each language has its own competition for best system, and different languages 
might have different laws. Some languages might not even recognise any laws, should 
they lack the resources to describe the world’s regularities. Relative to the language used 
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by physicists, the laws will be those of physics. Relative to the language used by 
economists, the laws will be those of economics (assuming that there are such laws). 
At this point, the extension of the BBSA should be clear. Begin with a framework in 
which laws are language-relative and then extend this to cover higher-order regularities. 
As the competition for best system can be run in any language that we choose, so too can 
we then run the competition for the best second-order systematisation of that system in 
the same language. Whether that competition will offer us metalaws depends on two 
things. First, it depends on what the first-order system is like. Should this be sufficiently 
disordered or lacking in content, we might not get a strong and simple system of second-
order regularities describing it. That’s the right result: whether there are metalaws ought 
to depend on what the laws are (which in turn depends on the way the world is).  
Second, whether we get metalaws depends on the language chosen in the way noted by 
Lange. We should not take this to be a troubling concern. After all, the motivation behind 
the BBSA is that we need to look to the practices of the relevant scientists to know what 
language is appropriate for assessing the associated best system. Let us do exactly that: 
pay attention to the terminology used by scientists working in the field under 
consideration and consider a language that includes such predicates. Return to covariance 
under temporal displacement as an example term. If physicists are wont to work in a 
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language that includes this term then we should assess the best systematisation of first-
order physical laws in a language that includes it.17  
While metalawhood is not tied in a metaphysical sense to any specific choice of language, 
such fixing of a language is required for practical purposes: failure to do so would lead to 
individuals talking past one another when discussing metalaws. This paper’s position is 
that our usage of the language of physics is an implicit recognition of that need. While 
there are systems of laws and metalaws available for different choices of language, these 
alternatives are set aside when we speak of “the metalaws of physics.” There is no need 
for naturalistic Humeans to prescriptively claim that physicists must use the language 
they do to arrive at the metalaws we recognise.18 Scientists are free to work in whichever 
 
17 There is a tension here between using physics as a guide to perfectly natural properties 
and the desire to let “the language of physics” to be set by what terms actual physicists 
use. I suggest that suitably naturalistic Humeans should favour the latter consideration 
and bite a bullet here: there will not be a one-to-one correspondence between the 
predicates used in physics and the perfectly natural properties. 
18 Earlier I considered the reply that the best system need only be better than its 
competitors and found it wanting since it could not guarantee that we’d arrive at the 
metalaws. As an anonymous referee asks, why not be concerned here too? The reason is 
that extending the BBSA drops the sense in which the second-order best system is unique, 
as there will be competition for best in every language. With a unique best system, it 
matters whether it contains the metalaws: failing to do so means failing to reflect the 
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language they find most productive in advancing their field. Not everything is up for 
grabs: the mosaic of events ultimately determines what regularities are available to be 
described. But certain languages, and their associated ways of carving up the world, will 
make it easier to find strong and simple regularities. Similarly, a choice of language will 
be better to the extent that it helps physicists discover such heuristically useful principles 
as metalaws. 
On this view, there is no requirement that physicists use a language that includes 
predicates like covariance under temporal displacement and so judges the spacetime 
symmetries to be simple. But the importance of the metalaws to contemporary physics is 
motivation enough for physicists to do so. Progress in physics would be inhibited by 
working in a language without such predicates and so a choice of language that delivers 
the known metalaws is better to that extent. The fact that it fails to meet the standards of 
perfect naturalness is of no concern here, since we have dropped the requirement that all 
predicates in the competition language need to correspond to such properties.19 The 
 
practice of physics. Without uniqueness, we can be confident that there will be a language 
available where the second-order best system contains the metalaws. I take the claim of 
the BBSA to be that physicists have shown that they prefer to work in such a language. 
19 This separates laws from natural properties, although Humeans do not have to drop the 
latter entirely: they can earn their keep in other areas of metaphysics. See Dorr and 
Hawthorne (2013) and Dorr (2019) for the other roles natural properties play. 
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second problem that Lange raises for extending the BSA simply does not occur when we 




Putting the Framework to Use 
The importance of offering a Humean account of symmetries goes beyond capturing an 
aspect of scientific practice: it provides a way of disarming a critique from the philosophy 
of physics concerning necessary connections and categoricity. McKenzie has argued that 
the Humean package of categorical fundamental properties and contingent laws of natural 
is untenable when one examines how these are connected to the symmetries of quantum 
theory.20 In this section, I will both explain the alleged tension and show how the metalaw 
interpretation accommodates this talk of symmetries without commitment to irreducible 
necessity. Lange (2007) challenged philosophers of natural law to offer an account of 
metalaws. This section shows that an answer to that challenge can do further work 
illuminating how Humeans should understand (meta)nomic necessitation. 
To begin, assume that the laws of quantum theory are fundamental. The fundamental 
entities are the particles described by the Standard Model, which come in multiplets: 
families of particles that possess differing magnitudes of the same determinable 
properties. These multiplets are described through the mathematics of group theory, a 
consequence of which is that each family’s interactions will be associated with certain 
symmetries. Now consider a possible world that contains duplicates of some actual 
particles described by the Standard Model: 
 
20 McKenzie (2014). Her point is that the entire canonical debate needs to be rethought, 




[I]f we understand the laws operative there along quantum-mechanical 
lines it follows that those laws must possess the symmetry of the laws of 
the actual world. But that represents a hugely informative and non-trivial 
constraint on the laws that any such set of duplicates can accord with. 
(McKenzie 2014, 55, emphasis in original) 
Humeanism – particularly in the style of Lewis – is built upon a foundation of categorical 
properties, those that do not impose any constraints upon the laws that they enter into. For 
example, there are worlds where the electrostatic force described by Coulomb’s law 
declines as the inverse cube of distance, rather than the inverse square. Whether there are 
any limitations on the form that a law for charged particles can take remains an open 
question; McKenzie points out that various metaphysicians seem to believe that there are 
no non-trivial limitations whatsoever. This ties in with the contingent status of laws: since 
there are worlds with duplicates of charged particles that do not obey Coulomb’s law, that 
law cannot be metaphysically necessary. If there are non-trivial constraints on the 
behaviour of particle duplicates, then their kind properties are not categorical. If those 
properties are not categorical, then there are restrictions on the laws that can describe 
their behaviour and so the laws are not contingent. Hence necessity of the actual 
symmetries threatens the Humean package of commitments. 
Despite that, McKenzie does suggest that a reconceptualised Humeanism might still be 
viable. It is worth pausing to explain why this new look is an uncomfortable fit. The core 
of her suggestion is that the relation between group theory and multiplets is a 
mathematical one:   
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[I]s it not at bottom a mathematical fact that a set of particles, defined by a 
given set of determinate values, cannot participate in laws of quantum-
theoretic form with arbitrary symmetry structure? (McKenzie 2014, 59, 
emphasis in original) 
This emphasis matters, since contemporary Humeans are not normally opposed to facts 
holding of mathematical or logical necessity. So, McKenzie continues, if mathematical 
necessity is not a problem and the determination of the laws for a set of particles is born 
of mathematical necessity, then there is nothing in this picture that Humeans need to be 
alarmed about. They should instead abandon the commitment to contingent laws as based 
on outdated physics and embrace a new world of necessary fundamental laws. 
My concern is with taking the introduction of necessity as acceptable whenever the 
particles in question are defined by the mathematical values following from the relevant 
symmetry. No part of that manoeuvre is specific to the theory being a quantum one. The 
same move works in the classical context too: as long as we define the entities in question 
by the mathematical values that some theory assigns to them, we can then claim that there 
are unmysterious necessary connections between them of a mathematical nature. But if 
we can get necessity in the world whenever properties can be represented mathematically, 
then the floodgates have truly been opened. Humeans have been unwilling to treat 
necessitation in mathematical representations as entailing necessitation in nature, despite 




A more promising line for Humeans to take in response to McKenzie’s problem is to 
utilise this paper’s approach to symmetries as metalaws. The difficulty arose because of 
the claim that duplicates of actual particles must behave in ways that are ultimately 
captured by appropriate symmetry principles. On the face of it, that is a similar claim to 
the usual ones involving laws. Two like-charged particles, for example, must accelerate 
away from one another in the absence of any other forces. Since the laws are necessary, 
duplicates of those particles in similar conditions must also accelerate away from one 
another. But for all this talk of the connection between laws and necessity, Humeans have 
a standard line of response about why particles always behave in ways described by the 
appropriate law. This is not because the law makes them do so, it is because the law is an 
accurate description of their behaviour. That we expect duplicates to behave similarly is 
understood as a restriction of possible worlds: among those worlds where our physical 
laws are true, particles behave in the same way. 
As for laws, so for metalaws. If we understand the relevant symmetries via this paper’s 
framework, they end up as higher-order descriptions of the mosaic, which includes the 
particles and their behaviour. That actual particles behave in ways described by the 
symmetries is because those symmetries are accurate descriptions of what happens (albeit 
indirectly; the metalaws are more directly concerned with the laws). As before, the related 
necessity is reduced to restricted quantification over worlds. The symmetries hold of 
metanomic necessity, which is to say that there is a sphere of possible worlds whose 
events occur in accordance with the actual metalaws. 
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Counterfactual suppositions about the behaviour of particle duplicates will often have 
them behaving in ways described by our symmetries. That’s not because these are the 
only possible worlds but because the resolution of counterfactuals standardly depends on 
contextual factors that restrict the range of worlds under consideration. In the same way 
that we typically try to avoid widespread violations of laws when assessing 
counterfactuals, we attempt to minimise metalaw violations. As such, worlds that our 
symmetries are true of will often be the closest in this assessment. In other contexts, such 
as the resolution of counterlegals concerning classical worlds, the symmetries of the 
Standard Model will not be relevant. At those worlds, counterparts of actual particles 
behave in ways that our actual physics does not describe. 
What of the claim that our understanding of, say, charge is tied to group theory and hence 
to particular symmetries? Then particles at worlds described by a different symmetry 
structure cannot truly be said to have the property of charge. Is that not a restriction of 
categoricity and the introduction of necessity? 
Tying the identity of a property to its nomological role would introduce an anti-Humean 
form of necessity. Such nomic necessitarianism21 is committed to the actual properties 
only being associated with the actual laws – alien laws must cover alien properties. 
However, this position is not uncontroversial. In the present debate, it cannot merely be 
asserted but must be argued for. In the remainder of this section, I turn to two arguments 
that McKenzie deploys in defence of necessitarianism. 
 
21 In the terminology of Schaffer (2005). 
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The first argument is that if we are discussing duplicates of entities, we first need to settle 
what those entities are. If we agree that they are quantum entities, then they are associated 
with certain symmetries and we must use laws of a quantum template to describe them. 
Kind duplicates of quantum entities are also quantum entities and so must fit the same 
nomological structure. Hence, they cannot behave in arbitrary ways. 
What is it for an entity to be a quantum entity? The most obvious response is that it is the 
sort of entity described in a quantum theoretic way. But if this implies that duplicates of 
that entity are also quantum entities and so must be described in a quantum theoretic way 
too, then it straightforwardly begs the question. If calling an entity quantum at the outset 
enforces a limitation of its otherworldly behaviour, then of course we must use quantum 
theory to describe it. But that necessity was introduced by calling the entity a quantum 
one. We cannot demonstrate that duplicates of elementary particle kinds are modally tied 
to the symmetries of the Standard Model by first limiting the possibilities we are willing 
to consider to those where the relevant laws possess the same regularities as our own. 
Restricting our attention to the sphere of metanomic possibility will inevitably result in 
the conclusion that duplicates will act in accordance with the actual symmetries. On the 
other hand, if an entity’s being quantum does not impose any such limitation, then it is 
difficult to see what point there is in attaching the label. 
The necessitarianism that McKenzie advances might be underwritten by a particularly 
strong form of naturalism. While it is common for philosophers to treat science as giving 
us reason to think that certain arrangements of events are possible, one might go further 
and suggest that science is the only guide to possibility. The only possible worlds that we 
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should take seriously are the physically possible ones.22 This has the advantage of 
providing an explanation for why a particular arrangement is a genuine possibility that 
goes beyond conceivability or metaphysical fancy. 
It does, however, also come with a substantial downside. One important use of possible 
worlds is providing truth values for counterfactuals. By replacing metaphysical possibility 
with physical possibility, this strong naturalism would fail to appropriately back the truth 
values of a wide range of counterfactual claims. If there is no world in which the 
antecedent of a counterfactual conditional is true, then the entire conditional ends up 
being trivially true. This might not be a great cost when it comes to fantastical scenarios 
involving sorcerers and talking donkeys! But, as McKenzie emphasises, the actual world 
is a quantum one. If the actual laws rule out classical worlds then any counterfactual 
concerning classical scenarios is automatically true. Given that scientists make appeal to 
such counterfactuals, that is a large bullet to bite. 
Such considerations are not decisive, of course. Hardcore naturalism might be made 
compatible with nontrivial counterfactuals by adopting a hybrid view of possible worlds, 
where some worlds really exist and others are just useful fictions. Evaluation of such a 
proposal is a significant project itself and does nothing to lessen the upshot of this section. 
Even a strongly naturalistic philosopher cannot move straight to the conclusion that 
particle duplicates act only in ways described by the actual laws and symmetries. There 
 
22 In Schaffer’s (2005) terminology, this would be modal necessitarianism, which 
recognises only a proper subset of the worlds recognised by nomic necessitarianism. 
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are costs to that claim regarding how best to deal with various counterfactuals, and these 
costs can be weighed up against the costs of accepting a full plurality of worlds.  
The aim of the paper is to further develop the Humean account of metalaws, which is 
compatible with that account coming at a cost in its commitments. Acceptance of the 
language-relativity of the BBSA might be another of those costs, as suggested in the 
previous section. While a specific commitment regarding the language of candidate 
systematisations is not necessary to respond to McKenzie, it is required to overcome 
Lange’s second objection. This section demonstrates the value of developing such a 
Humean account of metalaws: responding to Lange’s challenge provides Humeans with a 
way to interpret physical symmetries without thereby being having to accept irreducible 
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